ISTANBUL -- Since the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings in 2011, Russian president Vladimir Putin has been the most dependable ally of the Assad regime in Syria. President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan of Turkey, by contrast, has incessantly called for the overthrow of the Damascus government. While ErdoÄŸan has made a concerted effort to organize and arm the jihadis fighting Assad, Putin has categorically referred to all such groups, even those backed by Turkey, as "terrorists." Earlier this week, Russia's support for Assad entered a new phase as Russian fighter planes bombed opposition targets in Syria for the first time.
For the past three years, Ankara has been demanding a safe zone in northern Syria where oppositional forces can regroup, as well as a no-fly zone to protect them from Assad. The apparent goal behind this plan was to allow the West's and Turkey's Syrian protégés to conquer Aleppo (Syria's largest city) and eventually take Damascus as well. Putin's latest maneuver, however, has rendered such schemes completely impractical. Russia has now sent surface-to-air missiles and air-to-air combat fighters to Syria.
Given that neither the Syrian opposition nor ISIS possesses an air force, the presence of these Russian armaments right at the Turkish border is an obvious warning to Turkey -- which has downed a Syrian fighter jet and Syrian helicopters in the past -- not to interfere in this conflict. Turkey's inaction following occasional incursions by Russian fighter jets into its own air space should be interpreted in this light.
ErdoÄŸan is generally viewed as an outspoken politician who does not hesitate to criticize the EU, the U.S. and Israel, often in highly abrasive language calculated to appeal to his base. And yet the Turkish president has been comparatively mild towards Russia. At no point over the past four years has ErdoÄŸan issued a harsh reproof of Putin, not even after Russia's recent aerial bombardments, about which ErdoÄŸan merely expressed his "regret and dismay." To grasp ErdoÄŸan's seemingly contradictory stance towards Putin requires some knowledge of the system of crony capitalism which has sprung up and flourished -- particularly in the energy and construction sectors -- in both Turkey and Russia.
ErdoÄŸan has been comparatively mild towards Russia. At no point over the past four years has he issued a harsh reproof of Putin.
Russia is, by a wide margin, the world's greatest exporter of natural gas. In 2013, its total natural gas exports stood at $73 billion, with Turkey being the second-biggest purchaser after Germany. However, Turkey differs from other major customers of Russian natural gas in one crucial respect. While rates of dependence on Russian gas in Germany, Italy and France range from 16 percent to 39 percent, Turkey relies on Russia for 62 percent of its own natural gas.
Earlier this year, to everyone's surprise, ErdoÄŸan awarded a bid for the $20 billion Akkuyu nuclear power plant (intended to reduce his country's energy dependence on natural gas) to Russia. In 2014, the volume of trade between the two nations totaled $31 billion. While Russia's exports to Turkey amounted to $25 billion, Turkey's exports to Russia came to only $6 billion. With a balance of trade which is unfavorable to Turkey, and with Turkey dependent on Russia for the bulk of its natural gas, ErdoÄŸan's decision to grant the nuclear power plant bid to Russia would be inexplicable were it not for the fact that his business cronies have invested billions of dollars in Russia, particularly in construction.
During ErdoÄŸan's 13-year tenure, Turkey has witnessed a veritable boom in the construction sector. Since 2002, when the AKP first came to power, investments in construction have exceeded $600 billion dollars, with the greatest profits invariably reaped by companies close to ErdoÄŸan. In return, such companies have purchased newspapers and television stations, helping to create a pro-government media and to stifle opposition journalism. The aforementioned Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which will make Turkey entirely dependent on Russia for energy, will be built by the construction firm Cengiz Holding, a parent company of the pro-AKP media.
Moreover, Russia's eagerness to invest in Turkey is matched by Turkish companies' investments in Russia. Under Putin -- who effectively controls the entire Russian economy -- Turkish construction firms have been awarded all manner of bids, from shopping malls to facilities for the Sochi Winter Olympics. Since 1988, investments in Russia by Turkish construction firms have reached $50 billion, much of it over the last 10 years. The largest foreign construction firm operating in Russia, Rönesans Holding, is a Turkish company. It has completed more than $6 billion worth of projects there, and is known to have a cozy relationship with Putin. (The company is perhaps best known in Turkey for having built Erdoğan's extravagant, highly controversial presidential palace, over 30 times the size of the White House and four times the size of Versailles.)
Moreover, Turkey is keen to elevate the image of Putin in the eyes of Russia's 20 million Muslim citizens, many of whom are ethnically related to Turks. A Turkish firm was responsible for building the brand-new Moscow Cathedral Mosque (financed by the oligarch and Putin crony Suleyman Kerimov), whose lavish opening ceremony last month was attended by both Putin and ErdoÄŸan. Another Turkish company is scheduled to build a new mosque in the Crimea, recently annexed by Russia; the mosque's construction costs will be met by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs.
Muslims pray outside the newly restored Moscow Cathedral Mosque during celebrations of Eid al-Adha. (AP Photo/Pavel Golovkin)
To be sure, Putin has forged close business ties not only with Erdoğan but also with European leaders such as former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder and former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi. Yet the budgetary resources available to Erdoğan -- who has managed Turkey almost single-handedly for 13 years -- are without equal in other comparatively sized countries. Particularly during the latter part of Erdoğan's tenure, Turkey has seriously regressed in crucial areas such as the rule of law, transparency in business life and freedom of the press. While this has drawn heavy criticism from the West, Putin has always emphasized his close friendship with his Turkish colleague.
The strength of the ties between Ankara and Moscow is evident in DavutoÄŸlu's pronouncement that Turkey was in an "alliance of destiny" with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The strength of the ties between Ankara and Moscow is evident not only from ErdoÄŸan's jesting remark to Putin, "Make us part of the Shanghai Five, and we'll reconsider the EU [accession process]," but also from then-Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄŸlu's pronouncement that Turkey was in an "alliance of destiny" with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Turkey and Russia's "alliance of destiny" shares one other important feature: recurring wide-scale popular demonstrations against their increasingly authoritarian regimes. Russia currently leads the world in the number of law enforcement personnel per capita, with 565 police officers per 100,000 people. Turkey lags only a little behind, coming in second place with 475 per 100,000. Such figures are a good indication of the fear with which both regimes view protests and demonstrations.
As stated at the outset of this article, Turkey and Russia remain divided on the crucial question of Syria and Assad. Yet even on this subject, it is hard to imagine ErdoÄŸan seriously challenging Putin. Ankara's complaisant attitude towards Russia in the recent civil war in Ukraine, or during Russia's 2008 military occupation of Georgia (whose government was backed by ErdoÄŸan), is a clear acknowledgement of the limits of its own political power.
In the final analysis, Russia is a global power sitting atop vast reserves of oil and natural gas in addition to being a major arms manufacturer. Turkey, by contrast, is a modest regional power whose influence in the Middle East has been diminishing since the Arab uprisings. In the years leading up to 2011, when Turkish regional hegemony was at its zenith -- and ErdoÄŸan and Assad were still on good terms -- DavutoÄŸlu famously described his country's foreign policy as being based on "zero problems with neighbors."
This naively optimistic assessment was eerily echoed by DavutoÄŸlu's recent statement -- following repeated violations of Turkish air space by Russian fighter jets -- that "Russia is our neighbor and friend, and our interests do not conflict." Aware that Turkey will emerge the loser in any confrontation with Russia, ErdoÄŸan and the AKP have pragmatically accepted Russia's geopolitical superiority, while seeking to reap the maximum financial gain in the process.
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